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REVIEWS.

Die soziologische Erkenntnis. Positive Philosophie des sozialen Lebens. Von GUSTAV RATZENHOFER. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1898.¹

IN a magazine review it is difficult to do justice to a work like Ratzenhofer's. Ratzenhofer resembles that other equally important sociologist of German Austria, Gumpłowicz: he is not merely a fully independent thinker, who understands how to concentrate philosophically and cast into a unified form the most comprehensive physical, psychological, and sociological science; he is also very peculiar in regard to the systematic formation of his thought, and employs necessarily a terminology at variance with scholastic language. This work, written for professional colleagues, with whom it avoids every explanation, even for the sake of the coherence of its thought, is therefore a very difficult work to arrange in an assenting and dissenting criticism. Instead of such a notice, therefore, we shall best do justice to the work before us by an analysis, with occasional digression for comment. We may preface this analysis by a single general objection. Ratzenhofer himself maintains that the present work, together with his other, entitled *Wesen und Zweck der Politik*, which appeared in 1893, form "the doctrinal structure [*Lehrgebäude*] of sociology." They might be the beginning, perhaps, of "a doctrinal structure" or "system." The work is, indeed, a compendium of signal importance and of enduring value, pregnant with thought and suggestive; it is so systematically put together that every stone is indispensable and none superfluous. But are these two treatises, after all, "the" system or even the "doctrinal structure" of sociology? This the reviewer cannot concede. The book under discussion, *Soziologische Erkenntnis*, fully deserves its alternative title whereby it claims to be "a positive philosophy of the social life." It is undoubtedly the most significant of recent attempts at philosophical concentration of sociological knowledge; it is, further, a vigorous attempt at the dovetailing of a "posi-

¹Translated from *Zeitschrift für die gesammte Staatswissenschaft*, viertes Heft, 1898 (pp. 733 ff.), by MR. and MRS. CHARLES A. ELLWOOD.

tive philosophy of the social life" into a unitary philosophy of the universe. The reviewer is acquainted with no other such attempt more significant in content, or in style more perfect. But "the doctrinal structure of sociology" is not yet to be regarded as effected by it. I expressed my opinion concerning this recently in the introduction to the second edition of my *Bau und Leben*; namely, that "the doctrinal structure" of sociology cannot from the outset be finally constructed, because all the special disciplines of social science are not yet even combined for a sociologically unified presentation, to say nothing of being combined in proportional measure for the above purpose. The reviewer, who cannot be reproached with being an enthusiast for the continuation of the traditional parceling out of social investigation, is still unable at present to give up the opinion that the possibility of a definitive "positive philosophy of the social life" is not yet given; that the time is not yet come—a fact, moreover, which Ratzenhofer himself opportunely emphasizes on p. 4 and elsewhere. If the reviewer could subscribe to all the rest of the work—which, moreover, is not the case—he could not indorse the first two lines of the preface, according to which the two works "form the doctrinal structure of sociology," either in respect to the words "the" or "doctrinal structure." Having prefaced the review with this single general remark, we shall now proceed to our analysis.

Ratzenhofer's *Sociologische Erkenntnis* treats of its subject-matter under seven principal divisions, viz.: I, "The Nature of Sociological Knowledge;" II, "The Psychological Basis of Sociology;" III, "The Physical-Science Basis of Sociology;" IV, "The Social Process of the Human Race;" V, "The Basis of Sociology;" VI, "The Social Forces;" VII, "Social Development in the Light of Social Knowledge."

For the present review the first division, which treats of the nature of sociological knowledge, is of special significance. This is not to say that the other divisions are only a supplement of significant ideas; the remainder of the work is rather throughout a suggestive sample of inquiry in respect to the "nature of sociological knowledge." For a review in a journal of social science, however, this first division has an especial significance for the purpose of indicating what the author wishes, and what I might in sincerest acknowledgment say he *is*. The reviewer is able in many respects to indorse unreservedly its content, in spite of holding another professional view as to the nature and conception of politics.

The contents of the first division regarding the nature of politics are further divided into three subdivisions: (1) "The Task of Sociology," (2) "The Method of Sociological Investigation," (3) "The Positivism of All Knowledge and Science."

In the portion upon the "task of sociology" Ratzenhofer devotes a few pages to a survey of the consideration and investigation thus far of the reciprocal relationships among men — a survey which could scarcely be more simply and correctly given. He remarks (p. 2): "Without being reasonably conscious of the connection with one tendency or another, men have always given much attention to social relationships, because they recognized that they dominate the most essential part of their life interests. The state, law, and industry were investigated without succeeding in obtaining a scientific basis for these branches of knowledge. Mind remained yet as something independent of material conceptions, and the destiny of men seemed to be an arbitrary work of divinity or chance. With such opinions it was difficult to believe in a scientific content of the reciprocal relationships of men. The psychical sciences remained far behind securely advancing physical science, until at the end of the nineteenth century they are forced by the latter to recognize as undeniable the conformity of everything in existence to law. The researches which concerned themselves with the reciprocal relationships of men were, from the writings of Aristotle down to modern times, of a predominantly descriptive and only incidentally investigating character. Attaching itself to Galileo and Bacon's conception of the world, the endeavor to find out the causes of historical effects progressed slowly; and the historical school began with Machiavelli and Montesquieu to acquire influence over political science. The development of humanity and of its culture was judged by Herder, for example, by means of the natural sciences; especially the investigation of the economic life of peoples made advancement by virtue of the energy peculiar to its interests. Malthus and Smith really began the scientific treatment of human relationships. But these doctrines concerning the economic relationships of men could not be verified, and are coming to be more and more contested, because they lack the basis of a doctrine of human reciprocal relationships, and because they were conceived at a time when natural science had not yet demonstrated convincingly that conformity to law upon which they necessarily rest. Attempts, on the contrary, to found a sociology — the most famous of which was Herbert Spencer's — were not able to dispel the doubts in respect to it, because this meritorious fault is (to such a

degree) inherent in these attempts : viz., they seek to explain society merely from the nature of the individual, while the real question pertains to society itself. Therefore the purpose of Quetelet, and of all statistics, to comprehend society in 'human averages' has failed. Society is no phenomenon of averages, but an effect of all individual phenomena in which the conformity to law of the reciprocal relationships of men is fulfilled. So the result was that sociology in general did not meet with that belief in its scientific mission which acts as a spur to all investigation. It was denied with especial vehemence that sociological knowledge is possible as a part of philosophy. People believed that they could exhaust the subject-matter of sociology with the descriptive special sciences, like ethnology or demography. Without connection, full of contradiction, and unconscious of purpose, a series of special sciences now concerned themselves with the reciprocal relationships of men. Jurisprudence, upon a historic foundation, stands impotent in the face of social needs ; the political sciences, which never had a sure foundation, lose their authority ; the special sciences, like ethnology, culture-history, and others, dispense with all guidance and put forth wild sprigs on the tree of science. Statistics believes that it can derive the conformity of social affairs to law from inadequate numerical material, and overlooks the fact that the most essential qualities in the social life are practically intangible. History does homage to a fantastic view of the reciprocal relationships among men ; sciences like medical jurisprudence, criminal anthropology, psychiatry, which ought to proceed purely experimentally, become whole schools (Lombroso, Benedikt, etc., etc.), with corrupting theorems concerning the moral nature of men ; for even ethics can find in philosophy hitherto no reliable foundation. So the development of all the special sciences which discuss the reciprocal relationships of men is just at present in a crisis. This crisis rests chiefly upon the circumstance that natural science has thrust back speculative philosophy in every direction, while the judgment of social relationships cannot dispense with philosophical discussion. However, all the adversities which sociological thinkers like Schäffle, Gumpłowicz, and others have experienced cannot check the human endeavor to bring the great world process of social evolution under universally valid propositions. And so will these attempts necessarily lead to sociology becoming a science so soon as the necessary preliminary conditions for it are found."

It is notorious that those who decades ago claimed for sociology an independent place as a science, alongside of the psychical sciences,

have experienced severe rebuffs from the latter. While consistently validating the above historico-scientific conception as to the "denial on the part of the psychical sciences" of an independent sociology, Ratzenhofer flings the gauntlet in the face when he remarks (p. 5): "While philosophy has in the main hitherto recognized only two principal territories, psychical life and the phenomena of the material world, there has remained a third territory, by it too little considered, which has a psychical life, as well as, also, the phenomena of the material world—the societary life. In the fathoming of the same philosophy must find its reawakening. The societary life points to the innermost instincts of man as the explanation of the position of every individual as distinct from the generality. It opens for us the outlook upon a gigantic field of science which we, in the dimness of our discernment, hitherto have regarded as belonging partly to the science of individual consciousness and partly to the sciences of the material world. It devolves upon sociology as a part of philosophy, of course with psychology, to disclose the fundamental principles of this domain of science and to command it. As the latter (psychology), upon the basis of physiology, investigates the inner nature of man, the former (sociology), upon the basis of history and ethnology, discloses the external relationships of man. But both disclose the physical life of men only in conjunction with natural science, whereby the comprehension of all knowledge appertaining thereto devolves upon sociology. A philosophy without sociology is like a psychology without physiology: it is a speculation given over to subjective fallacies. Along with cosmological, psychological, and ontological problems belong also the sociological; for our thinking is not fully circumscribed until to the ideas of the world, I, and eternity are added those of human reciprocal relationships. Because this problem has not hitherto been fundamentally considered, the moral ideal of philosophers (humanity, virtue, happiness, etc.) has remained a phantasma; we comprehend it only when we fully understand psychological knowledge concerning the individual will through sociological knowledge concerning the social will. Sociology is the philosophical basis for the sciences of human relationships and their most essential manifestation, politics. What physics and chemistry are to natural science, such is sociology to the sciences concerned with human relationships; what mechanics is to material forces, such is a doctrine of politics to social forces. Sociology purposes, therefore, not the concrete investigation of single social phenomena—that is the task of the special sciences related to

it—but it purposes rather the investigation of the conformity to law of the societary life. Indeed, sociology is the result of those single inquiries which have concerned themselves with social relationships from time immemorial, just as natural science is the result of experiences and observations which have through all time been accumulated. It is manifest that such a sociology cannot be a complete structure of knowledge, because only upon its foundation will regulated investigation of social relationships arise; but thereby sociology is only following the same course of development which is common to all the sciences. For the auxiliary sciences advance hand in hand with the fundamental science, and the corresponding systems of the same do not arise until general investigation has reached considerable proportions. Only from a philosophy widened through sociological knowledge can ethics and æsthetics, free from objection, arise, and the philosophy of law, political science, and political economy be able really to become sciences.”

The second subdivision of the first part is devoted to the method of sociological investigation. In it Ratzenhofer points out that the independence of sociology is not to be denied on the ground that it has not from the beginning had a perfect method, and, at present, has not yet such a method; even the exact science of astronomy has had the same fate. Sociology must endeavor to get nearer the truth, while it more and more excludes the errors (of speculative construction). Natural science, which points out with its method the way of empirical investigation, may at present not yet exempt sociology from further using to a certain degree the crutches of speculative knowledge. “Since the natural sciences”—Ratzenhofer remarks (p. 10)—“at least in regard to their relation to social phenomena, proceed utterly unconscious of purpose, speculative knowledge must for a long time yet be the touchstone for the validity of many mediated facts. We meet here the old experience that the psychical sciences can only thrive when induction and deduction supplement each other, and when a judicious use of speculation is not denied them. It would be easy to show that at present many sciences, or special branches of knowledge demeaning themselves as science, prolong their life through the denial of this mixed method, that they go astray into fields of investigation which are without interest through overvaluation of induction, or have fallen into trivial hair-splitting through overvaluation of deduction. To the natural sciences there remains always with their investigations an indissoluble residue which is reserved to speculation; but

every speculation is worthless which loses sight of the realistic background."

The third subdivision of the first part treats of the "positivism of all knowledge and science." The author here adopts the most rigorous standpoint of Comtean positivity (*Positivität*); but in spite of it, or just on account of it, he rejects the haughty and sterile conception of the "purposelessness" or, more plainly speaking, "disinterestedness" of all science. He remarks (p. 17): "Science is no longer satisfied with an insight into things, with investigation of the existent and the past; it wants rather to put insight and retrospection at the service of prevision." According to Huxley, every science whose future application deeply concerns it, must take care "that it be possible for it to divine from the existing state the past and the future." Only through such knowledge does science preserve its proper position in the life of man. "If we consider the task of science to be the seeking of laws for all phenomena, we find that a multitude of endeavors which are but distantly related to science sail under its flag; for the search for laws in phenomena is not the gratification of mere desire of knowledge, but the effort even in itself is purposeful, because only from conformity to law can conclusive inferences regarding the past and future arise. That, in this case, the past, whether it be investigated or ascertained through deduction, will be put at the service of prevision lies in the nature of purposeful science." Nägeli says rightly: "If causal knowledge succeeds in foretelling future events with the same certainty and precision as astronomy, it will stand the test." With the demonstration of laws in human relationships we enter the path in which prevision into events is to be found—a path which has long since been trod experimentally by the science of medicine and with full certainty by all exact sciences.

This review can only consider much more briefly the remaining six divisions of Ratzenhofer's *Soziologische Erkenntnis*.

The second division treats of the "psychological" basis of sociology in four subdivisions: (1) "The Place of Man in the Universe," (2) "The Biological Origin of Consciousness," (3) "The Innate Content of Consciousness," (4) "Consciousness as Distinct from the Outer World." The third division, which is devoted to the "natural-science basis of sociology," treats the subject under four subdivisions: (1) "The Relation of Natural Law to Sociological Knowledge," (2) "The Doctrines of Universal Evolution," (3) "The Redistribution of Matter and Its Consequences," (4) "The Doctrines of Biological Phe-

nomena." Both the second and third divisions are teeming with intellectual power and knowledge, especially with unerringly applied knowledge of the natural sciences. The latter, especially in regard to Weismann's theory of heredity, will be very suggestively turned to account in the founding of a sociology.

Ratzenhofer's ontological digressions, based upon his pantheistic world-philosophy, we pass without comment. They are, and perhaps will always remain, speculative postulates of the same doubtful value as those of a theistic world-philosophy. Besides, Ratzenhofer's ontological speculation remains no capstone on the sociological structure, but is followed out in its consequences. It has certainly neither convinced us in its major proposition of the primitive force, and of its differentiation in creation, even up to social creation, nor has it convinced us with its wealth of deduction derived for special "sociological knowledge." However, let the reader here judge for himself.

A presentation of the author's view of the "unity of biological and sociological evolution"—a unity toward which the whole discussion of the first and second divisions is aimed—will be most objectively given, if we quote the following passages from the concluding remarks of the third division (p. 117): "An essential reason why sociological intelligence has so long delayed to recognize a unity of law for biology and sociology has its roots in the apparent freedom of movement of social elements in comparison with cells (*biophores*) in the organism. The cell apparently belongs permanently to the organism; it comes, it goes, with the individual, and is not, like the elements of society, able to change its association, or to belong to several structures. This possibility, despite the concession of unity of law, lies, above all, in the fact that a unitary origin from primitive force belongs to both organic and social structures. If an organism evolves itself from the germ, in accordance with its innate interest, it stands forthwith, in relation to the outer world, individualized and isolated. In this condition of life it is able neither to fulfill the destiny of its species nor to preserve itself. Since propagation is, as it were, an extension of the individual beyond his own bodily substance, innate interest forces the individual to enter into relationships beyond his sphere of bodily sensibility, and thus to form social ties in association with individuals having related interests; this is likewise an extension of the individual beyond the limit of his bodily interests. The same interest which evolves a creature somatically, and then mentally, renders social relations also necessary to it; for, otherwise, the creature leaves its

narrow life-purpose unfulfilled and exposes this to infractions. Social relationships, hence social structures, are a consequence of our biological evolution, of the primitive force working therein, and of differentiating individuation. Self-preservation, physiological interest, the effort to perfect our individual and social interest, the effort to propagate our racial interests, force us to social relationships. Thus we can impute to social evolution as a more remote effect of causes active in the evolution of the creature no other laws than those which are peculiar to biological occurrences—just as the laws of chemistry, physics, mechanics, geology, and, lastly, cosmology were fundamentally established by recourse to earlier evolutionary processes. So the unity of law in the world spontaneously presents itself. The difficulty in discerning this unity disappears before a knowledge of the decisive significance of inherent ‘interest’ for all individuation of primitive force. Just as, in the order of evolution of conscious creatures, we observe a growth of the faculties of consciousness whereby the individual seeks more and more to guard his interest through extensive thought-combinations, so the changes accompanying social phenomena grow more and more out of the immediate realm of physiological interest, and gain a psychical content. But in this connection we may not forget that this content has the nucleus of its being always in that physiological interest. The lower the organism stands, the simpler is the dependence of the social structure to which it belongs upon the material concerns of the species. The social structures of the plant world are but the product of its propagating increase; those of the animal world are a product of this increase, and also a product of natural selection, of union for predatory purposes, and for protection against other species. For men also the same motives for social union originally existed; but with increasing civilization the mediate gratification of wants becomes the motive for social union, whose coherence with the material interest of the individual or the species can be recognized only through combinations of ideas. Through elevation of the social world into the world of psychical relationships the validity of biological laws is not, on that account, annulled, because everything psychical has its roots in the reality of facts and phenomena. We must only know how to apprehend these biological conditions intelligently. The nearer the motive to a social union stands to physiological interest, the less easily can a societary element withdraw from its association; it will arise and perish in its association like the cell in the organism. This is met with in most associations based

upon descent. If the motive of association arises among those of transient relationships, the maintenance of which can have a proportional significance for the fate of the individual, indeed, but does not absolutely decide it, then the individual can also change his association. This social mobility is related to the transitoriness of the thoughts of our conscious organism. But this mobility is limited through the individual's innate interest; for, if he undervalues any material part of this latter, he perishes through the biological law according to which the dependent cell dies, if it leaves that organic complex which has developed it. . . . Because man, in his highly developed conscious state, recognizes that the social development is able to guard his individual interest, even in political struggle, the social part of his innate interest is strengthened more and more. Thus individualistic differentiation loses, in the natural course of evolution, a part of its anti-social effect. In its stead social evolution appears with a growing perfection of the conscious organism. A systematic penetration into the social nature of men will increase insight into the unity of law of all phenomena; and, with constant reliance on the assured teachings of the natural sciences, we shall obtain the certainty of the genetic agreement of social with all other phenomena of life."

In order to characterize completely Ratzenhofer's conception of the relation of social to physiological phenomena, it seems fitting to present further from Division V the following passage. This passage seems to us to be, in another relation also, one of the most significant and pregnant which the book contains, particularly as it presents more clearly Ratzenhofer's peculiar theory of interest. The author remarks (p. 221): "The agreement of the organic life-process with the social process is no figurative comparison, but it is causal. That hitherto the science of society has not been able to demonstrate this connection-through-natural law is the essential cause of its poor success. The older method of biological analogy ought, moreover, to have set the critique of former sociological speculation on its guard, because every science works with comparison, and even astronomy bases its most important discoveries upon geometrical similarity. When, for example, a well-known scholar (Wundt, *Logik*, II, 576) says: 'Presumptively the method of biological analysis will find application also in the future as a means of exposition, where it is suitable to give expression to that view which places value upon the connection of societary systems united in the state; on the other hand, those views which give preference in politics and economics to individual interest will intentionally

avoid such comparisons'—it calls attention, in the first place, to the already mentioned animosity toward sociology, and, secondly, it suggests how alien the individualistic knowledge of the acutest thinkers was only a short time ago to the real nature of social occurrences; otherwise it must even at that time have struck the author of the above lines that 'societary systems' and 'individual interest' have the relation of cause and effect, and this results directly from biological occurrences. Since the organism is morphologically developed through the innate interest of the germ, and since in this development of the nervous system conformably to its germ is pre-patterned also the psychical life of the creature, man moves in conformity to interest in the presence of the social world, and conducts himself in it in accordance with his germ capacities, and according as his innate interest and the interest later necessitated (acquired) through life-conditions prescribe for him. All life springs from the unsearchable primitive force; the differentiation of this life follows through adaptations to life-conditions for creatures with an innate interest, which really comes to expression in the germ capacities. Without differentiating causes the cosmic world would remain an infinite extension of original matter and the organic world the repetition of homogeneous cells. Through the differentiating change of conditions of life physiological interest awakes with life, and individual interest with consciousness. These are but the differentiated individualization of the interest of the species. The physiological interest, which, confronting the various life-conditions, impels to varied organic evolution, forces also the individual to an adaptive behavior, whereby, however, he is brought into opposition with his fellow-creatures; the adaptive behavior finds expression partly through natural selection, partly through the survival of the fit, partly through the change of location of those who have been disadvantaged—the opposition manifests itself in the struggle for existence. As long as only the interest of the species dominated, the social interest was the same to all. But as soon as individual interests arise, social interest also differentiates itself at once; for every individuality, be it a species under organisms or a community, has its special social interest. The differentiation of the organic world into different species is, strictly considered, a social differentiation of all creatures. In the social process of mankind, as well as of single animal species, this differentiation is continued upon the basis of different graded characteristics of the morphological and intellectual variety. And in this continuation of differentiation and of all development into the territory of intellec-

tual manifestations of life, which, however, can be nothing else than the product of morphological facts in the organism, the undeniable connecting link between the organic and the social world is found—a transitionary stage which we by no means merely hypothetically assume, but which we see unmistakably proven every hour in ourselves and our environment. That among all creatures differentiation in the case of mankind is so much more manifold and complicated is due to the fact that man is himself the paramount product of differentiation of the organic world. We may not compare man with the animal species somatically nearest him. For he has, even in the lowest races, passed through such a differentiation of his consciousness, that is, of his intellect, that between him and the most highly developed animal world there exists an unbridgeable chasm. Man has been differentiated from the animal world through certain capabilities. Therefore the social differentiation of men happens in great part in the territory of interests which stand in a very mediate, even if fundamental, connection with physiological interest. The social activities of animals, on the other hand, rest merely upon immediately operating physiological impulses. To this circumstance is to be ascribed also the fact that the differentiation of human communities is not merely the resultant of active physiological interests. Already to individual interests belong thought-associations, built upon ideas, whereby man subjects his choice of comrades to cautious, or at least instinctive, reflections. In so far as such spring merely from individual interest, they lead the man back to the demands of his physiological interest. He who belongs to his social group only conditionally and unreliably becomes an egoist. But in so far as such reflections spring from the interest of the species, or finally from social interest, they guide the man to moral renunciation of self, whereby he receives impetus to coördinate or even subordinate his individual weal to that of his community. This is an evolutionary phenomenon, which points to the underlying principle of all creation. In the interest of the species is shown the effort of primitive force to resist the degeneration caused through differentiation and variation—a phenomenon which is determinative for the question as to the inheritance of acquired characteristics. The production of unifying mutual relationships manifests itself in the face of the individualistic atomizing impetus as indispensable for the natural development of society, just as the biological degenerations caused through variation are brought back to the normal of the species through the continuity of the germ plasm—unless compelling causes exist in the

conditions of life for that variation. The degenerations caused through individualization lead partly to voluntary, partly to forced, subordination of individuals in a social union. The more life incites individual interests, the more important is social constraint to limit the degenerating differentiation, in order not to endanger the species and its social structures through war of all against all. Since, however, all interests are ever firmly anchored in the physiological interest, nature always brings back with its conditions of life all extravagances of individual and social development, whether they be the product of excessive differentiation or of inexpedient socialization, to the paths of social necessity founded in the needs of nourishment and propagation. The first sure concept which we have of the nature of our being is *interest*, and this is also the guiding principle in the biological as well as in the social process. Since inherent interest is modified in creatures through the change of life-conditions, the causes of social structures becoming differentiated are given. We must recognize clearly the fact that variation of interests goes in advance of the phenomena of the social process; just as the natural change of life-conditions goes in advance of this differentiation of interest. The cause of this differentiation lies in the needs of men, and that of change of life-conditions in universal, natural occurrences with their consequences for organic and social life. The innate and acquired interest is the source of all human needs, and, in its changeable manifold forms, the guiding motive of all movements in the biological, psychical, and social process of the individual and of humanity. 'Interest,' therefore, in positive philosophy takes the place of the contradictory concept 'purpose,' which gave the widest opportunity for every erroneous presupposition and every vagueness concerning the relation of mind and nature. Indeed, the vanishing of this concept is alone a far-reaching step for the furtherance of metaphysical knowledge."

The fourth division is entitled: "The Social Process of the Human Race." It discusses successively: (1) "Primitive Social Structures;" (2) "The Evolution of Higher Social Structures," which through a blending of militant with industrial tribes is claimed to have produced the state and the people (*das Volk*); (3) "Social Differentiation within the State," which, according to Ratzenhofer's view, produced the nation (*die Nation*); (4) "Social Differentiation of the Sphere of Civilization" (*Kulturkreis*); (5) "The Extension of a Dominating Social Process over Humanity" (commerce, colonization, migration, etc.). All these chapters contain thoughts which are worth reading, but

which for a later "doctrinal structure of sociology" will scarcely be authoritative. However, we would not fail to bring to notice two single conceptions, with one of which we disagree, with the other we agree. I refer to Ratzenhofer's "nation" and "sphere of civilization." Concerning the origin of the nation, Ratzenhofer's opinion is: "While a people, conceived as a mass of subjecting and subjected tribes, is effectuating differentiation, the blending of tribal oppositions advances, and there is developed an organization of guiding, operating, and administered social structures, which finally, despite inner struggles, become a social unity called a nation. The nation is the completion of the process which was introduced through the founding of the conquering state." That is not the whole truth, however, about the origin and nature of the "nation." On the other hand, noteworthy suggestions are found in Ratzenhofer's chapter on the "Sphere of Civilization" (*Kulturkreis*) as the "territory of coöperative social evolution." Political science, perhaps, has occasion to consider more important than hitherto Ratzenhofer's "sphere of civilization" as the material foundation of consonant and dissonant political organization. Ratzenhofer remarks: "All the phenomena of interest, which with differentiation become effective within the state, spread beyond the state to seek within kindred civilization support and satisfaction. On this account many social structures will have adherents also beyond the limits of the state, and there will result, notwithstanding the state, a social differentiation of the sphere of civilization. The social differentiation of the sphere of civilization has always been dangerous to the state as an organization of power. It dissolves the inner necessity of its exclusiveness, and points through social relations to the widening of political barriers and relations of authority. Even if the instinct of conquest was generally the visible motive for widening the domain of the state and for creating great empires, nevertheless the fact of a homogeneous civilization, and even more the fact of social relationships with outside territories, has been the inner cause of the expansion of state domain. To this effort is to be ascribed the fact that a state should attain the leadership inside a sphere of civilization, through political superiority—as Athens or Sparta in the Greek sphere of civilization—or that a state should extend its sovereignty over the whole respective sphere of civilization—as Rome, the Frankish empire, or the empire of the Caliphs. In order to escape the menace of peoples of kindred civilization, states have endeavored to shut off also socially their political individuality, or at least to prevent the loosening of their social condition through

the spread of social relationships with foreign countries, which develop all too easily into political intermingling."

The fifth division is entitled: "The Fundamental Doctrines of Sociology." It discusses successively: (1) "Individualization and Socialization" (authority and partisanship, order and freedom); (2) "Social Differentiation and the Leading Principle in the Social Process"; (3) "Social Individualities" (forms of association); (4) "The Conditional Tendency to Perfection in the Social Process"; (5) "The Fundamental Phenomena of the Social Process." As such are treated: nutrition and reproduction; the act of perfecting (*Vervollkommung*); variation; the struggle for existence; absolute hostility; differentiation; the relation of authority; individualization and socialization; variation of interests; association; social necessity; the state, society. At the conclusion of this division an epitome of Ratzenhofer's sociology in eighteen propositions is given upon seven pages (pp. 244-50). In this appears, with the concluding thesis, a second state, the later state of equality (*Gleichheitsstaat*), in opposition to Ratzenhofer's above emphasized state of inequality. "In proportion as the civilized state takes the place of the conquering state, the differences in the satisfaction of interest among individual men are again equalized. The political, social, and economic inequality among men is transformed to the equality in participation of enjoyment which exists in primitive social conditions. The all-sided socialization of humanity complicates social structures, but it approaches to harmony of interest, through a growing perfection of the social organization, without, however, being able, with the existing diversity of life-conditions, to remove all motives for social conflict. The social order is an organization of the struggle for existence for the purpose of assured nutrition and propagation of healthy generations. It is therefore justifiable to assume, as the concluding stage of social evolution, a condition in which, despite manifoldness of professional individualities, a cultural, political, and social equality of men appears under the guidance of individuals who are intellectually and morally most perfect. Under this domination of moral and intellectual authority, social evolution, without degeneration of innate and acquired interests, would, perhaps, be possible; but this equality would remain immeasurably modified through the inequality and change of life-conditions."

The sixth division treats of "The Social Forces" in four subdivisions: (1) "Social Impulses," (2) "Individual Will," (3) "The Development of Individual Will," (4) "The Social Will." The seventh

division, finally, discusses in detail (1) "The Activity of the Individual Will in Itself" (*an sich*) (the problem of the freedom of the will herein discussed); (2) "The Activity of the Social Will in Itself and in Its Relation to the Individual Will," (3) "The Modalities of the Evolution of the Will," (4) "The Principal Phenomena of Human Evolution which Comprehend all Manifestations of the Will" (culture, politics, civilization). The general value of these last divisions consists in the counter-application (*Rückanwendung*) of sociology to psychology, ethics, and æsthetics. Especially are the discussions of "social regeneration" (upon the basis of Weismann's theory of heredity) of great interest (pp. 271-84).

The whole work closes with the propositions: "The theological phase of intellectual evolution socialized society upon the basis of an absolute subjection of the individual. The metaphysical phase raised the individual at the expense of his necessary socialization. On the other hand, it devolves upon the positivistic phase to obtain again the full significance of socialization, in order that individuals may be able to perfect themselves physically, intellectually, and morally. Theological knowledge started from God and ended in uncertainty or in doubt. Metaphysical knowledge started from belief in the infallibility of our reason and ended with pessimism and materialism. Positivistic knowledge starts from the natural facts of our ethically demonstrable evolution, and ends with the certainty of our perfection in the system of mutual dependence of all things, which points the way to rise inwardly to a belief in God."

DR. A. SCHÄFFLE.

Elements of Sociology. (A Text-Book for Colleges and Schools.)

By F. H. GIDDINGS, M.A., PH.D., Professor of Sociology in Columbia University. The Macmillan Co., 1898. Pp. x + 353. \$1.10.

WHATEVER the sociologists may think of Professor Giddings' viewpoint or method or conclusions, they cannot afford to neglect anything that he writes. They are alike following the true, even if vague, instinct that the rest of social science fails to provide sufficiently for investigation of all the relations which must be explained before the conditions of the conduct of life can be completely understood. If others are closer than Professor Giddings to adequate perception of what sociology involves, none deserve more generous recogni-